In 2015, under the Obama
Administration, the United States helped
broker a multi-national deal that did
something rare for the U.S.: it reduced the
likelihood of war without firing a shot.
Formally
called
the Joint
Comprehensive
Plan of Action,
what came to be known as the Iran
Deal slowed down Iran’s production
of weapons-grade uranium. In other
words, it reduced Iran’s nuclear
capacity in exchange for relief
from economic sanctions.
By
2018,
Donald
Trump
made sure that deal was gone.
In its place, Trump implemented a
new strategy. The administration called it
“maximum pressure” - marketed as strength,
framed as leverage, and sold as a path to a
better agreement.
But no better deal ever came.
Instead, what followed was
something far more familiar: a permanent
state of tension. No war, no peace - just
enough instability to keep the machinery
running.
Because in the United States, war
isn’t the only thing that generates profit.
The conditions for war also
generate huge profits.
From Containment to Volatility
The
Iran
nuclear agreement, negotiated
under Barack
Obama,
wasn’t a grand solution. It was
never promoted to be that. It
didn’t end Iran’s nuclear
ambitions. It didn’t resolve
regional conflicts.
What it did do was reduce the risk
of war and the risk of Iran gaining nuclear
weapons.
It diminished Iran’s uranium
stockpiles. It limited enrichment. It opened
facilities to international inspection. Most
importantly, it extended the time Iran would
need to build a nuclear weapon.
In short, it lowered the
temperature - which was one of its goals.
But
that
changed in 2018, when Donald
Trump
withdrew the United States from
the agreement and reimposed
sweeping sanctions.
The Trump Administration said the
logic was simple: apply enough economic
pain, and Iran would return to the table for
a “better deal.” Trump called his approach
“maximum pressure.”
But the outcome told a different
story.
The original Obama Administration
agreement was a trade - limits in exchange
for relief. The “limits” were not vague -
they were concrete, measurable constraints
on Iran’s nuclear program. Under this
agreement, Iran could no longer quickly
accumulate bomb material. In exchange,
roughly $100 billion in Iranian global
assets would be unfrozen, Iran would regain
access to global banking, and oil exports
would resume.
But the Trump Administration’s
“maximum pressure” removed the relief and
kept the demands in place. The incentive for
Iran to comply disappeared overnight.
What followed was predictable.
Iran scaled back its commitments.
Iranian nuclear activity resumed. Tensions
rose.
Volatility came back online.
Instability as Infrastructure
This is where the analysis usually
stops in mainstream corporate media - but
it’s really where it needs to begin.
Instability is not just a byproduct
of failed policy. In the United States, it
functions as infrastructure.
Here is how it operates as
infrastructure. A high-tension geopolitical
environment:
-
justifies expanded military
budgets
-
drives weapons sales
-
moves global energy markets
-
and grows entire sectors
devoted to sanctions enforcement and
financial control
None of this requires active war.
It requires persistent threat.
That’s what “maximum pressure”
delivered in 2018.
The Attention Economy of Crisis
There is another layer - quieter,
but just as consequential.
Crisis reorganizes attention.
When geopolitical tension dominates
headlines, everything else competes for
oxygen:
These issues don’t disappear. But
they lose continuity. They fragment. They
fade in and out of view.
We
live
in an attention economy, and war -
or the threat of it - is one of
its most powerful organizing
forces.
In the media, it captures
bandwidth. It simplifies narratives. It
shifts focus. It displaces complexity.
And in doing so, it changes what
the public is able to hold in focus long
enough to demand change and accountability.
The Missing Off-Ramp
“Maximum
pressure”
was framed as leverage. But
leverage requires an off-ramp - a
clear, credible path from pressure
to relief.
That never materialized.
Instead:
From Iran’s perspective, the lesson
was obvious: agreements can be reversed with
a change in administration. From Obama to
Trump - two opposing policies while Iran
initially held to its side of the agreement.
From the system’s perspective,
something else became clear: a stable
agreement had been replaced by a durable
standoff.
And a standoff has advantages.
It sustains urgency.
It justifies spending.
It keeps markets reactive.
Above all, it prevents resolution.
From Maximum Pressure to Managed
Instability
The
transition
from Donald
Trump
to Joe
Biden
was widely framed as a return to
diplomacy.
But that return never fully
materialized.
Biden
entered
office promising to revive the Joint
Comprehensive
Plan of Action
- a restoration of the original
trade: limits in exchange for
relief. But in practice, the
administration kept the core
architecture of “maximum pressure”
in place.
Sanctions largely remained. Relief
was partial, delayed, or conditional.
Negotiations stalled.
The result was not a restored
agreement, but a suspended one - neither
alive nor formally dead.
And in that suspension, something
important happened.
The system adapted.
Instead of resolving the crisis,
U.S. policy shifted toward managing it.
Iran continued expanding its
nuclear capacity. Monitoring weakened.
Breakout timelines shrank. At the same time,
the United States maintained sanctions,
sustained military positioning in the
region, and preserved the broader pressure
framework.
This was no longer a negotiation.
It was a holding pattern.
A durable equilibrium built on
unresolved tension.
From Pressure to Kinetic Signal
That equilibrium did not remain
purely economic.
It turned kinetic.
In
June,
Donald
Trump
ordered direct military strikes
inside Iran - an escalation that
crossed a line previous
administrations had avoided. The
action was framed as targeted and
strategic, but its effect was
broader: it reintroduced direct
military confrontation into an
already unstable system.
And then, just 20 days ago, that
escalation widened.
What had been a long-running
pressure campaign - economic, diplomatic,
and covert - shifted into open conflict.
The United States is now engaged in
active military operations against Iran.
Not a declared war.
But not peace either.
A condition in between.
The System Holds
This is the part that demands
clarity.
Because if you step back, the
pattern is unmistakable:
At no point does the system return
to stability.
It stabilizes instead around
instability.
And once that happens, escalation
is no longer an anomaly.
It becomes a continuation.
From Deal-Breaking to System
Maintenance
The failure of “maximum pressure”
is often framed narrowly: it didn’t produce
a better deal.
That’s true.
But it misses the larger pattern.
The collapse of the Iran agreement
did produce something:
-
sustained geopolitical
tension
-
expanded defense and security
spending
-
ongoing volatility in energy
markets
-
and a public discourse
anchored in crisis
This is not accidental.
It reflects a system in which
instability is not merely tolerated - it is
productive.
The Bottom Line
The Obama Administration’s Iran
Deal reduced the likelihood of war.
Trump’s “maximum pressure” didn’t
lead to a stronger agreement. It led to a
more unstable environment - one that
reintroduced risk, amplified tension, and
extended uncertainty.
The Biden Administration did not
fully reverse that trajectory. It maintained
the pressure framework while attempting -
unsuccessfully - to restore diplomacy.
And now, that long-managed
instability has crossed into open conflict.
The United States is bombing
targets. People are dying.
At
the
same time, the U.S. Congress has
not issued a formal declaration of
war since World War II - even
though the Constitution assigns
that responsibility to Congress.
That hasn’t stopped the executive
branch from using military force.
Whether a war has been formally
declared or not, the reality on
the ground can look and feel
exactly like war.
That distinction - between declared
war and ongoing military action - is not
semantic.
It is structural.
Because a system that avoids formal
declarations can engage in sustained
violence without triggering the full
political, legal, and public accountability
that war is supposed to require.
And in a system where instability
generates economic and political return,
that outcome is not neutral.
It is functional.
The system doesn’t need a formally
declared war to thrive.
It needs continuous, managed
conflict - constant, unresolved, and just
credible enough to sustain the cycle.
Considering that it has been
reported we are spending nearly $2 billion
per day in Iran, the conclusion is difficult
to avoid:
The machinery of war doesn’t
require the word “war.”
It only requires that the violence
continues.